DRCCLACBS: US Credit Card Delinquency Rate Quarterly from FRED (1991–2026)

The US Credit Card Delinquency Rate tracks the share of credit card balances at commercial banks at least 30 days past due, quarterly since 1991, from the Federal Reserve Board. It is the fastest-reacting gauge of household credit stress: unsecured, high-rate, and the first payment consumers miss. The range runs from 6.77% at the 2009 peak to 1.53% at the stimulus-era floor of 2021; after a post-2022 normalization that peaked at 3.22% in early 2024, the rate stood at 2.92% in early 2026.

Dataset: US Credit Card Delinquency Rate (1991–2026) · Updated 2026-01-01

Latest Value
2.92%
Jan 1, 2026
Historical Percentile
31.2th
Below average
Historical Average
3.69%
141 observations
Historical Range
HIGH
6.77%
Apr 1, 2009
LOW
1.53%
Jul 1, 2021

You have the data. Get what it means. New analyses and the live macro-regime read — only when there's something worth your time. No filler.


Loading data…

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System · FRED series DRCCLACBS


Macro Takeaway

Card delinquency is the canary metric of the consumer cycle, and its post-pandemic path is a study in base effects: the climb from 1.53% (2021) to 3.22% (2024) generated years of “surging delinquency” headlines, yet the 2024 peak sat roughly where the series spent most of 1995–2007. Normalization from an artificial stimulus floor and genuine deterioration look identical for the first two years — the level context this full history provides.

The 2024–2026 stabilization back toward 2.9% — below the pre-2008 norm — is consistent with the labor-market configuration: layoffs near record lows keep income flowing even as hiring cools. Card delinquency historically breaks upward only when unemployment rises materially, which is why it pairs with the unemployment rate rather than leading it.

The bank-held universe matters for interpretation: this series covers commercial bank portfolios only. The New York Fed’s Consumer Credit Panel, which covers all lenders and reports 90+ day transitions, has shown notably higher stress among non-bank and subprime segments in recent years — the aggregate here understates tail-borrower strain while correctly sizing the systemic exposure, best read against household leverage.


Dataset Overview

IndicatorUS Credit Card Delinquency Rate (1991–2026)
GeographyUnited States
FrequencyQuarterly
Period1991 – present
Variablesdate, cc_delinquency_rate
FormatCSV, Excel (XLSX)
SourcesBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, via FRED (DRCCLACBS)
Last updated

Dataset Variables

The CSV and Excel files contain the following columns.

ColumnTypeDescription
dateDate (YYYY-MM-DD)First day of the reference quarter
cc_delinquency_rateFloatDelinquency rate on credit card loans, all commercial banks, percent, seasonally adjusted

A value of 2.92 means 2.92% of credit card balances at commercial banks were at least 30 days past due.


Download the Complete Dataset

The full dataset is available in CSV and Excel formats.

You have the data. Get what it means. New analyses and the live macro-regime read — only when there's something worth your time. No filler.


FRED Direct CSV Access

The underlying data is available from FRED under series code DRCCLACBS:

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.csv?id=DRCCLACBS

Direct CSV Access — Eco3min Structured Dataset

https://eco3min.fr/dataset/credit-card-delinquency.csv

This URL returns the complete dataset in CSV format. It can be used directly in pandas, R, curl, or any data tool.


Using the Dataset in Python

import pandas as pd

url = "https://eco3min.fr/dataset/credit-card-delinquency.csv"
df = pd.read_csv(url, parse_dates=["date"])

print(f"Latest: {df['cc_delinquency_rate'].iloc[-1]:.2f}% of balances 30+ days past due")
print(df.tail())

Using the Dataset in R

library(readr)

url <- "https://eco3min.fr/dataset/credit-card-delinquency.csv"
df <- read_csv(url)

tail(df)
summary(df$cc_delinquency_rate)

Both examples load the dataset directly from the URL — no download or API key required.


Methodology

The Federal Reserve Board computes delinquency rates from the quarterly Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (“call reports”) filed by all US commercial banks. A loan is delinquent when 30 days or more past due (still accruing) or in nonaccrual status; the rate is delinquent balances over total balances, seasonally adjusted.

The series therefore measures bank-held card loans — it excludes cards issued by non-bank finance companies and securitized balances moved off bank balance sheets, a scope that has shifted over decades as issuance structures changed.

This dataset is updated daily (Mon–Sat, 08:00 UTC) via automated pull from the FRED API; new observations appear with each source release.


Data Quality & Provider Notes

  • Release latency. Published ~2 months after quarter end with the Board’s charge-off and delinquency release.
  • Revisions policy. Minor — call-report corrections occasionally adjust recent quarters by a few basis points.
  • Universe. All US commercial banks; non-bank issuers and securitized pools excluded. Coverage of the card market varies over time with securitization practice.
  • Alternative measures. NY Fed Consumer Credit Panel (all lenders, 90+ day, borrower-level) runs on a different definition and level; the two series can diverge for quarters at a time.
  • Known gaps. None; continuous since Q1 1991.

Common Pitfalls When Using Card Delinquency Data

  1. Reading normalization as deterioration. The 2022–2024 climb retraced an artificial stimulus floor; against the 1991–2007 range, the 2024 peak (3.22%) was unremarkable. Rate-of-change alarmism without level context misread this episode for two years.
  2. Assuming full market coverage. Bank-held balances only. Subprime and non-bank stress — where post-2022 deterioration concentrated — is partly invisible here.
  3. Confusing delinquency with charge-offs. Delinquency (30+ past due) leads charge-offs (written off, ~180 days) by roughly two quarters; the two rates answer different questions.
  4. Treating it as a leading indicator. Card delinquency follows employment income; it confirms consumer stress rather than predicting the cycle.

Historical Regimes

1991–1997 — The first consumer credit wave. The rate climbed from ~4.5% toward 5.5% mid-decade as card penetration expanded faster than underwriting discipline — elevated delinquency in a growing economy.

1998–2007 — The 4–5% plateau. A structurally high but stable range; the 2001 recession barely registered — card stress was chronic, not cyclical.

2008–2009 — The GFC peak. Delinquency hit the series record of 6.77% (Q2 2009) as unemployment doubled — the only episode where the rate exceeded 6%.

2010–2019 — The great deleveraging. A decade-long decline to a 2.58% average in 2019: post-crisis underwriting (CARD Act, tighter scoring) structurally lowered the delinquency regime.

2020–2021 — The stimulus floor. Transfers, forbearance, and forced saving drove the rate to an all-time low of 1.53% (Q3 2021) — delinquency fell during a recession for the first time in the record.

2022–2026 — Normalization and plateau. A steep climb to 3.22% (Q1 2024) as stimulus effects faded and card rates hit records, then stabilization near 2.9% — above 2019, below every pre-2010 norm.


Related Macroeconomic Datasets

Card delinquency is the unsecured edge of household credit; the series below complete the balance-sheet picture.


Macroeconomic Dataset Hub

This dataset is part of the Eco3min macro-financial data repository.

Explore the Eco3min Dataset Hub

Sources

  • Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System — Charge-Off and Delinquency Rates on Loans at Commercial Banks
  • Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis — FRED series DRCCLACBS

Dataset Reference

Last updated — 4 August 2026

Disclaimer – Financial Information: The analyses, commentary, and content published on eco3min.fr are provided for informational and educational purposes only. They do not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell financial instruments. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investment decisions involve risk and are the sole responsibility of the reader.